Author: Alexander Starostin
Two eternal and main questions of Russian culture "Who is to blame?" and "What to do?" can be set in any situation and at any time. Undoubtedly, the answers to them are the most important starting points for the further development of everything that happens. To search for these answers, the USSR dispatched its best specialists. In all the previous parts, we watched how we began to solve the second question, because it can be formulated in two ways: what to do with Unit 4 and what to do so that other reactors do not explode? We will talk about the last aspect in the next part, and today we will start answering the question "Who is to blame?"
“... and here the senior committee faced a problem. She had two documents on her hands, indicating what exactly led to the accident. It is on the basis of these documents that we can talk about the punishment of the guilty and so on and so forth. However, these documents are essentially opposite in their essence and content, and the perpetrators are derived from them completely different ... "
Chernobyl, Moscow, further INSAG
Let's go back to April 26, 1986. As we all remember, on the day of the accident, a government commission was created to eliminate the accident, which included a number of scientists. She arrived in Pripyat on the evening of April 26 and began active work immediately. The main task of this commission at the first stage was to determine the scale of the accident, its causes and ways of elimination. It was headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Boris Evdokimovich Shcherbina, and the Minister of Energy A.I. Mayorets, who was in charge of the station, and the Deputy Minister of Medium Machine Building A.G. Meshkov, and the former Deputy Minister of Health E.I. from the IAE in the composition of the first deputy director of the IAE V.A. Legasov and V.A. Sidorenko, then the deputy chairman of the State Committee for Atomic Supervision.
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Formally, the court singled out the case against the developers for “not taking timely measures to improve the design” of the RBMK-1000 reactors into separate proceedings, but in fact these cases did not go far. They were closed in 1987 to reopen in 1990. Both Academician Dollezhal and the creator of the dosimetric control system Boris Dubovitsky, who accused the chief designer of Dollezhal of the accident, were interrogated. In 1991, the Prosecutor General's Office of the USSR was liquidated, and 41 volumes of cases were transferred to the Prosecutor General's Office of the newly formed RF. In 1993, all cases were closed, as many materials were transferred to Ukraine.
Author: Alexander Starostin