The USSR approached the starting window of 1961 in splendid isolation. The United States, abandoning its attempt to create an apparatus in 1959 (this attempt will be discussed later), postponed the start to 1962. Detailed study of the stations for launching to Venus and Mars began on the initiative of SP Korolev and MV Keldysh in the middle of 1958, at the height of the development of the first "lunar". This problem was too interesting, and I really wanted to solve it. The most advanced carriers of the USSR were the "lunar" rocket 8K72 and its more powerful modification - 8K73. Both of them were developed for launching devices to get to the moon and photograph its far side.
At that time, only rockets of the 8K72 modification were manufactured, the engine for the 8K73 was not yet ready, but this carrier was in all immediate plans. In particular, in May 1959, Glushko sent a notice to the Academy of Sciences and OKB-1 that he undertakes to supply an engine for the 8K73 carrier in 1960. But first it was necessary to understand what these rockets are capable of in terms of reaching other planets. In August 1959, in the Department of Applied Mechanics of the Mathematical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the staff of Academician M.V. Keldysh completed a detailed calculation, the results of which turned out to be controversial. The carriers could bring stations to planets, but with some restrictions. Particularly bad was the case with Mars in the years to come.The optimal trajectory with a meeting on the first half-turn (with launch in October 1960 and arrival to Mars in April 1961) was too tough for both rockets. Even the 8K73 had an advantage of 236 kg. It was just so much that it had to be lightened so that it could bring at least its last step to Mars, without any additional load. Several other trajectory options were analyzed. For example, when launched on September 15, 1960, the 8K73 rocket could bring 280 kg of payload to Mars, and the 8K72 - 230 kg. When launched on March 23, 1961, the numbers were even better - 342 kg and 240 kg, respectively. True, other problems began. In the first case, the flight time was almost a year, in the second - one and a half. Also, in the first version, the distance to the Earth was too large at the moment when the station would fly up to Mars.It was just so much that it had to be lightened so that it could bring at least its last step to Mars, without any additional load. Several other trajectory options were analyzed. For example, when launched on September 15, 1960, the 8K73 rocket could bring 280 kg of payload to Mars, and the 8K72 - 230 kg. When launched on March 23, 1961, the numbers were even better - 342 kg and 240 kg, respectively. True, other problems began. In the first case, the flight time was almost a year, in the second - one and a half. Also, in the first version, the distance to the Earth was too large at the moment when the station would fly up to Mars.It was just so much that it had to be lightened so that it could bring at least its last step to Mars, without any additional load. Several other trajectory options were analyzed. For example, when launched on September 15, 1960, the 8K73 rocket could bring 280 kg of payload to Mars, and the 8K72 - 230 kg. When launched on March 23, 1961, the numbers were even better - 342 kg and 240 kg, respectively. True, other problems began. In the first case, the flight time was almost a year, in the second - one and a half. Also, in the first version, the distance to the Earth was too large at the moment when the station would fly up to Mars.when launched on September 15, 1960, the 8K73 rocket could bring 280 kg of payload to Mars, and the 8K72 - 230 kg. When launched on March 23, 1961, the numbers were even better - 342 kg and 240 kg, respectively. True, other problems began. In the first case, the flight time was almost a year, in the second - one and a half. Also, in the first version, the distance to the Earth was too large at the moment when the station would fly up to Mars.when launched on September 15, 1960, the 8K73 rocket could bring 280 kg of payload to Mars, and the 8K72 - 230 kg. When launched on March 23, 1961, the numbers were even better - 342 kg and 240 kg, respectively. True, other problems began. In the first case, the flight time was almost a year, in the second - one and a half. Also, in the first version, the distance to the Earth was too large at the moment when the station would fly up to Mars.
Venus was a little easier. When launched on January 20, 1961, the 8K73 carrier could bring 510 kg to Venus (this is more than the mass of "Luna-3"), 8K72 - 420 kg, but this was the only successful trajectory. During the second maximum, in April 1961, the payload mass of the 8K73 dropped to 41 kg, and the 8K72 was not capable of pulling anything out at all.
The results did not inspire optimism, especially if you remember that you had to seriously count only on the 8K72 missile, but the same report showed a way out. The main problem leading to such results was the fact that the missile was used during the launch, if I can put it that way, in a "classical way." The active part of the trajectory was very small, and it was necessary to combine in it both the set of the required speed and the output to the flight trajectory to the planet. The second requirement often conflicted with the first. The last stage had to fly at a noticeable tilt to the horizon, while gravitational losses increased, and the launch became suboptimal.
The obvious solution was to split the inference trajectory into two stages. First, enter a near-earth orbit along the optimal trajectory. Then, already from near-earth orbit, with the help of the fourth stage, towards the desired planet. From an energy point of view, this was the most profitable option: the payload increased, the launch window expanded, the flight time decreased, and the accuracy increased. There was only one drawback. It was, in fact, a new medium that still needed to be developed. And if few doubted the three steps, then the fourth step, according to the recollections, terrified the developers. Much had to be implemented in it for the first time. The fourth stage was supposed to be launched in a vacuum, after a very long flight in zero gravity, and practically on the other side of the Earth, outside the zone of action of the NIPs of the Soviet Union.
But if Mars and Venus are needed, then just such a step is needed! The developers of the report wrote that they do not know how it will look. But if it is available, it will be possible to send an apparatus weighing about 500 kg to Mars in September 1960, and 800 kg of payload to Venus in January 1961. On December 10, 1959, a decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the government of the USSR "On the development of research in outer space" was issued.
This resolution marked the beginning of the creation of a space rocket for flight to other planets (Mars, Venus). The new rocket was named 8K78, and the fourth stage on it was the L block. The date of the decree has become one of the key dates in our astronautics. It was, in fact, the Rubicon, which becomes obvious if we compare the dates: the beginning of December 1959 is the release of the decree, and already in September 1960 "it is desirable to send the station to Mars." Less than a year separates these two events, and the developers have tried to make the impossible. They themselves understood that this was too optimistic a task. But the story of the conquest of Mars is still waiting for its book. Here we will dwell on Venus.
According to the decree, it was planned to create a station for the delivery of a special descent vehicle to Venus. It had to be developed before the beginning of 1961, but it was not possible to meet the deadlines exactly. Working drawings for the station were released only by September 1960, and before that all forces went to Mars. Then the idea arose to create a Venusian station on the basis of the 1M Martian apparatus - after all, it was already ready, at our disposal there were systems that could be used for flights to both Mars and Venus. The stations, manufactured on the basis of the first Martian one, received the index 1BA.
But first, we had to deal with their tasks. The task of photographing, as on 1M, already seemed not too impressive. Even from the photographs of Venus from Earth, it was clear that it would not be possible to see the surface of the planet. Fly millions of kilometers to photograph cloud cover? The experiment might be interesting in some ways, but clearly not good enough for the first attempt to reach the Morning Star.
As a result, they chose, maybe not so scientifically important, but a much more spectacular option with getting to Venus. It would be very tempting to put a descent vehicle on the station, and MV Keldysh really wanted this, but it turned out to be impossible to develop a full-fledged SA in these months. So it was replaced by a pennant with the symbols of the USSR.
Moreover, the pennant was not easy: inside it was a hermetically sealed float with a round commemorative medal. On one side of the medal there was a relief image of the state emblem of the Soviet Union, on the other side - a part of the solar system with the position of Venus and Earth at the time the station hit Venus, the inscription "USSR" and the year of launch. The float itself, made of titanium, had a diameter of 7 cm, a mass of 128 grams and was a miniature model of the Earth. On its surface, the contours of the continents and the water surface of our planet were depicted in color. The dimensions and mass of the float were specially selected so that when it enters the water environment, it floats.
There was another commemorative pennant outside. Curvilinear pentagons 1.8 mm thick and with a side of 14 mm were located on the outer surface of the float, forming a sphere. They were engraved with the inscription "USSR-VENERA-1961" (Fig. 25, p. 59) and the state emblem of the USSR. The pennant was placed in a special heat-shielding capsule, which protected it from overheating when entering the atmosphere of Venus, but the shell itself was heavier than water.
After the operation of a special powder charge, long before meeting the surface of the planet, approximately at the level of the cloud layer, the elements of the pennant capsule should have scattered in different directions.
The launch of the first station to Venus was scheduled for February 4, 1961. On January 8, OKB-1 engineers flew to Baikonur to test the apparatus. In the process of work, offensive design flaws began to come to light. For example, in order to change the setting of the solar-star sensor (and it depended on the launch date), direct access to the instruments was required. In these realities, this meant that it was necessary to remove the rocket from the start, take it back to the MIC and already there remove the fairing that opened the star sensor. Having learned about this, the famous space technology tester L. A. Voskresensky remarked to the designers who worked at the cosmodrome: βAll of you were thinking in the wrong place. For this, you, the designers, need to lower your trousers and whip them here, on the site, in front of all the people. Then force either the sensor or the fairing to be modified.But on the schedule, I have no time for a show flogging, or for improvements. I won't complain to Korolev. Now, if we do not get to Venus, I will explain the reason to him. "
It was necessary to survive until the launch vehicle was taken out from the AMS, and in the meantime, at the MIC at the cosmodrome, they were trying to bring the device to such a state that all tests would pass without problems. Worst of all, to fix each next problem, we had to completely disassemble the device, reassemble it, run it through all the tests, during which new problems were discovered again. And all over again ...
This is what B. Ye. Chertok remembers about this. He well expressed the mood that prevailed in those days at Baikonur.
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But the troubles did not end: already when the apparatus was docked to the carrier, it suddenly began to bleed nitrogen reserves from the attitude control system. The engineers quickly ran away.
Everyone remembered the recent explosion of the R-16 military missile, and if the valves opened, the engine could turn on. It was necessary to do something about this situation. The first to react was the tester Arkady Ostashev, who gave the command to undock the frame with the apparatus from the carrier and connect the remote control. The device has been successfully disconnected. Now it was necessary to understand the reasons for this emergency.
It turned out that due to the fact that the frame with the device moved slightly away from the carrier, the contacts of the device separation worked. The station decided that it was already flying to Venus, and tried to conduct the first communication session with the Earth ... Having figured it out, they slightly changed the switching scheme, in particular, introducing a lock until the package was installed on the launch pad.
The next day, everyone gathered near the MIC, waiting for the package to be taken out. The first attempt to take out the station at 6 hours 50 minutes failed. Korolev, looking at his watch, decided to teach everyone a lesson in accuracy. According to the decision of the State Commission, the export was scheduled for 7:00. Exactly at this time, the motor vehicle moved the cart with the rocket, slowly transporting it towards the launch complex. This operation was already well practiced and went without any problems.
After installation, abnormal operation of the third stage gyro horizon was detected. Having fiddled with it a little, we decided to replace it completely.
Late in the evening on February 3, right in the bunker, the last meeting of the State Commission took place. Everything was ready for launch. All suspicious systems have been replaced with new ones. Weather problems were not expected. The ships of the command and measurement complex took their places in the Gulf of Guinea, off the coast of Alexandria and in the Pacific Ocean. And now - the long-awaited launch. "Seven" beautifully left the start and, illuminating the night steppe, disappeared in the distance. Telemetry showed that all three stages worked properly, a new artificial Earth satellite appeared in orbit. Now block "L" should have been triggered.
Alas. A message came from the naval ships that the "L" unit did not turn on. The telemetry analysis clearly showed the culprit: the converter, which supplied power to the control system of the upper stage, had failed. In hot pursuit, we found out that this was just another blunder of the designers. The converter was installed so that it had to work in a vacuum, although it was not designed for this. On the next rocket, the necessary improvements were urgently carried out.
The converter was installed in a housing, and to ensure heat transfer, it was wrapped in foil and painted with black and white stripes.
After a short debate, it was decided to write a TASS message about the launch of another Earth satellite, without announcing its true mission. The jokers quickly dubbed the apparatus "the great mute." It was the heaviest satellite launched to date, and completely useless. There was no connection with him. He was in a very low orbit, and it was clear that he would not last long there. When, a week later, the air defense tried to find it, the satellite was no longer found in near-earth space. This launch was seized upon by the foreign tabloid press. Due to the fact that there was no official information about the purpose of the launch, the West solemnly announced it as an unsuccessful launch of a man into space. There were even radio amateurs who said they heard the beating of a human heart from orbit.
There remained the last attempt to reach Venus in this astronomical window. The last station 1VA No. 2 was available. At Baikonur, preparations began for the launch scheduled for February 12.
By the way, the story of 1VA No. 1 did not end there. This station reminded of itself again after a few years. One day in the summer of 1963, while swimming in one of the tributaries of the Biryusa (Krasnoyarsk Territory), a local boy, who remained unnamed, injured his leg on a strange ball. Boys are boys: he got interested and brought him home. The father managed to open it. Inside was a medal of the USSR with the trajectories of the Earth and Venus. It was the same pennant that was planned to be delivered to Venus!
The thermal protection of the capsule withstood, and the powder charge worked normally at the height of the cloud cover. True, Earth, not Venus. It was really good luck! The ballistic forecast gave the probability of falling on the territory of the USSR only about 6 percent. 90% came from the ocean.
Further, the history of the pennant can be traced well. The boy's father took him to the police, who transferred him to the KGB, and the state security to the Academy of Sciences. M.V. Keldysh decided that the pennant should be transferred to S.P.Korolev, who decided that it rightfully belonged to B. Ye. Chertok. Chertok writes in his memoirs that he looked "extremely stupid" when he held such a souvenir from the past in his hands. This pennant lay in Chertok's apartment for thirty years until it was sold at Sotheby's in 1996. It was a difficult year. Now everyone can see the body of the pennant in the memorial museum of cosmonautics in Moscow
. Keldysh's birthday fell in the interval between launches. On February 10, 1961, he turned 50. To the congratulations of his colleagues, he embarrassedly replied that a successful launch would be the best gift for him.
On February 12, 1961, at 07:04 a.m. 35 seconds, the rocket from the second Venusian AMS left the launch site. Three stages were routinely worked, putting the device into orbit, at a given time, the fourth stage turned on, sending the station on a visit to Venus. Subsequently, she was given the name: "Venus-1" (Fig. 26). This alone was a victory, which means that the carrier scheme was chosen correctly. Analysis of the trajectory measurements confirmed that the spacecraft should reach Venus, but for the hit it still needs to be corrected. The gift to the President of the Academy of Sciences was a success.
At the time when the successful launch was celebrated at Baikonur, telemetry was studied in Evpatoria. Problems were discovered: the station failed to enter the constant solar orientation mode, which led to a shortage of electricity on board. It was unpleasant, but such a development of events was foreseen, and in such a case, the station had to conduct a rough orientation to the Sun and turn off not "vital" systems. This immediately revealed another design flaw. Radio transmitters were included in the list of "unimportant systems", and communication with the device was lost. According to the logic of the on-board computer program (PVU), the transmitter should have turned on only after five days. It only remained to wait.
On February 17, the PVU energized the devices again, and a solemn report was heard on Earth: "There is a signal!" Unfortunately, this did not solve the orientation problems. When they tried to carry it out, the station again went into protective mode and turned off the transmitter. "Venus-1" meanwhile moved further and further away from the Earth. And the signal that was received from the omnidirectional antenna was getting weaker. On February 22nd, it was no longer possible to hear him.
By that time, it was decided to publish a detailed description of the device in the open press: after all, even the creation of such a station was a noticeable technical achievement - there were no analogues in the world. The hope for the restoration of communication was still glowing. In the end, when it became clear that the capabilities of domestic long-range space communication systems were not enough, they decided to turn to the British radio astronomer Bernard Lovell. Its 76-meter radio telescope at Jodrell Bank could theoretically receive a signal from the station's omnidirectional antenna.
By that time, there was already a tangible experience between the USSR Academy of Sciences and Bernard Lovell. He has been researching artificial celestial bodies since the beginning of the space age. Back in 1957, he carried out fairly accurate locations of the last stages of the missiles, which were brought out by Sputnik-1 and Sputnik-2. Also, it was he who at one time confirmed that "Luna-2" reached the moon, and his data helped to more accurately determine the place of its fall.
An official letter was sent to Lovell on behalf of the USSR Academy of Sciences. True, he was engaged in radio interception without any inquiries, he even managed to intercept the communication session on February 17. The letter reported the features of the flight, and also had a request: to try to get telemetry when Venera-1 flew past Venus. On May 17, 1961, the Jodrell Bank Observatory (Fig. 27) began listening to the broadcast, and the signal came! Since it was received precisely at the frequency of "Venus-1", its recording was sent to Moscow for analysis. Apparently, it was not possible to isolate anything definite from it, but the story had a continuation.
Since there was still hope of restoring communication, a group of Soviet specialists arrived at the British radio telescope on June 9 by Keldysh's order. These were Alla Masevich from the Astronomical Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences and one of the developers of the station's radio system, Yuliy Khodarev. Moreover, an agreement on this was reached in the most expeditious way of all possible: from Keldysh's office, Masevich called Lovell (she knew him well from previous trips) and, right during this conversation, arranged a visit. The problem with tickets and visas was resolved at a fabulous speed. The very next day after this conversation, Masevich and Khodarev flew to England.
With their help, it was possible to record several signals, but, alas, their source was on Earth. Unfortunately, it was not possible to confidently confirm the connection with the station, and on June 16 the Soviet specialists flew back to the USSR.
The history of "Venus-1" was over. The starting period of 1961 ended with the stock of manufactured stations. He did not bring anything new about Venus, but he gave many valuable lessons for designers. The next window did not open until a year and a half later, in mid-1962. And the United States had Venus plans for that launching window.
This is a fragment of my book βVenus. Indomitable planet ". Also, now there is a collection for my new book. It can be supported
here.