Game as a myth
In order to reveal the mythical nature of the later considered social phenomena, or, if you like, the social myths about games themselves, first of all it is necessary to reveal the ontological basis of the sphere itself, turned into a myth. Thus, the requirement necessary for effective work includes some ontological foundations, which will be the focus of criticism of those views that, with ontological truth, will manifest themselves in the guise of myth.
There may exist (and exists) in some part of the scientific community enough prerequisites to not only talk about the mythical nature of games, but also generally regard the existence of the Game as a Myth; that is, there is no game as a category with an independent ontology, there is only “play as”: “play as a form of communicative interaction”, “play as a process of observing combinations of conditions”, “play as similarities in the game behavior of humans and animals”, etc. where, in this case, the game is a symbol in relation to the object, while not being itself, that is, the Game; it is known that a myth defines a mythical detachment, that there is a detachment of facts in their idea from their usual ideological composition and purpose [1] , and what is accepted under the " Game”In this case - only poetic content in its naive form. It is this stupidity that is available to some scientific community that obliges to cite the ontological nature of the Game, in order with due confidence to regard the "games as" as a myth that levels out all the severity of the corresponding "research".
And so and above all, anything can be (and is) anything that in fact deviates from its ontological meaning, and this is the direct mythical existence that“Unites things in some new plane, depriving them of their inherent natural separation ... It is clear that it is better to speak not of mythical detachment, but that everything in the world in general, everything that exists, from the smallest and most insignificant thing to the world in in general, there is this or that degree or quality of mythical detachment ... The myth, we have seen, is a living, expressive and symbolically expressive, intelligently expressive being. A thing that has become a symbol and an intelligentsia is already a myth ” [2] .
That is, in order to turn the Game into a Myth, it is required to move away from its hermetic ontology and endow it with a separate meaning for it. Obviously, for the Game ontology itself, the results of studies of the manifestation of its being in the Myth will not give anything for being itself, unless it allows us to proceed from the opposite, and then we will get that “game as” both refers and does not refer to the Game, revealing that the most category "can". The fact that the Game can do something is not questioned, but this very potential goal-setting is the root of that detachment from the hermetic ontology: The Game is not applicable to anything as a Game, since Junger's Game is aimless, and for a researcher it is not there will be absolutely no sense in compiling a reference book about games [3] , as well as about myths.
The latter is known insofar as the Game itself does not cover questions of its human nature, which, for example, cannot be said about articulate speech. The playful nature of some of the animals is no secret, just as the mediocrity of questions about the functions of each game separately (since the encyclopedic nature of knowledge of games gives nothing but the identification of morphemes), and the functions of games in general, does not remain a secret. The function, as well as the goal, does not stand in questions of the existence of the Game, since the awareness of the existence of a function belongs to human nature. Nobody is going to deny here that there are games that have, in their esoteric nature, a methodology for the implementation of the intended functions, but this is, of course, provided that these functions are really conceived, and not a consequence of them. "Studies of play often turn out to be far from their subject, when they seek to ascribe some motives to the game or associate it with some goals ” [4] .
Thus, in order to endow the Game with a mythical form, it is enough only to betray the Game a goal as a meaning that lies not only outside the Game itself, but generally endowing the Game with the meaning of achieving the goal, even when the forms of games pass into the category of possessing a person. Such an ontological understanding of the Game is not an empty assumption, because if the condition of endowing the Game with a goal is met, It will acquire quite specific features of Work and cease to be a Game, which will undoubtedly expose its "prehuman" nature of existence. Therefore, it will not be superfluous to note here that, in contrast to the relatively primitive forms of the game morphology of animals, the nature of human games is so expressive that it can easily induce a researcher to make false conclusions about the main ontological properties of Games.
For all of the above, I had to break the covenant [5]about non-reasoning about the Nature of Games, but without this the ontological basis of the Game as aimless existentiality is impossible, but I think Jünger himself understood that by speaking about the property of game aimlessness, he revealed its ontology. With this reason, we discard goal-setting for the player as an incentive, because not only the Game itself does not have a goal, but in order for the subject to turn into a player, it is enough only to begin aimlessly existing behavioristic, or symbolic-interactionistic sense), which points us to the Game as a self-sufficient Itself for Itself and by Itself, which directly indicates its substantiality. Substance itself as a property can act as a reference point that does not go beyond the self,therefore, if we put the sign = between play and aimless existence, it can be argued that everything that exists aimlessly by itself acts as a player, and this very existence is a Game, respectively. Therefore, as a starting point, let us dwell on what we have now: Game is the ultimate (which is obvious) aimless existence, possessing the ultimate aimless existentiality, i.e. It is (in Hegelian) substantial, if not (in Aristotelian) NaturalIt is (in Hegelian) substantial, if not (in Aristotelian) NaturalIt is (in Hegelian) substantial, if not (in Aristotelian) Natural[6] . Keeping such an ontological basis, it is possible to amend Junger's statement about play as any movement, adding to it the concept of "aimlessness", and attributing the original statement to the concept of "expressed play".
, , . , « », « — », [7] , , , . , , - . , [8] , (« »), (« ») (« »). . . , – . , , . .
, , , , . . , , «» . , «» . , «», , , . «» «» , .
, , . , , , , , « – ». , . « », « », « » , , . .
, , : ( ) , . , , . - . , . , , «» (.. ) . , , , .
(« », « » ..), [9], ; [10], « » , « ». « », .
[1] .. : « . 8 – ».
[2] Ibid.
[3] F.G. Jünger: Games and the Key to Their Meaning, p. 36
[4] F.G. Jünger: Games and the Key to Their Meaning, p. 266
[5] F.G. Jünger: Games and the Key to Their Meaning, p. 42
[6] G.V.F. Hegel identifies the "nature" of Aristotle with the understanding of the "subject".
[7] G.V.F. Hegel: "The Phenomenology of Spirit", p. 38
[8] F.G. Jünger: Games and the Key to Their Meaning, p. 313
[9] F.G. Jünger: Games and the Key to Their Meaning, p. 76
[10] G.V.F. Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 28