When organizing security and monitoring compliance with all requirements for the remote electronic voting system, an integrated approach is applied, taking into account the best practices and experience in the highly loaded service of the e-government infrastructure. Security monitoring and analysis is carried out 24/7 at all stages, up to the end of voting. In particular, the forces of the corporate center of the GosSOPKA PJSC Rostelecom were involved in monitoring information security, which work in close cooperation with specialized organizations and competent authorities.
The day before, using an internal data control system, it was discovered that 22 transactions were not displayed in the uploaded file for download, including 13 transactions on the facts of issuing a blind signature to voters in the Yaroslavl region. Transactions were not uploaded to a file due to a short-term failure of the write service to the uploaded file when the main stream of votes was running. For completeness of the data, the file was updated (supplemented) with missing transactions from the blockchain.
Also in the dumped file there are 2 transactions for fixing the issuance of a blind signature for one userID, one of which was processed by the contract, and the second was ignored as incorrect (the absence of the result field). As a result, only one blind signature was issued.
When checking the integrity of messages, the system recorded one incorrect transaction with a ballot. Possible reasons for the formation of a bulletin that did not pass the integrity control could be the incorrect operation of the subscriber device or the strength test of the system. But anyway, there is no influence on the correctness of the vote count. There were no suspicious anomalies in the information security monitoring line.
The system is operating normally.