And make money on it ...
Sun Tzu "The Art of War":
Let them whisper in the streets of the enemy capital that the prince is robbing the people, his advisers have betrayed him, officials have drunk themselves to death, and the soldiers are hungry and barefoot. Let the inhabitants mutilate the name of their prince and pronounce it incorrectly ... Let them, with a well-fed life, think that they are starving. Let the wealthy envy those who graze livestock in Wei. Kindle an internal fire not with fire, but with a word, and the stupid will begin to complain and curse their homeland. And then we will go through the open gates ...
China, 5 Art. BC.
Just like millennia ago, in the modern world, the ability to control the spread of information (or disinformation) is an absolute must for any sovereign state.
Below I would like to share my personal thoughts on how to control and counteract the dissemination of (dis) information in relation to the current reality, where the dominant role is played by the network.
Announcement
Readers are asked not to take these reflections as a direct call to action. Please note that I am by no means considered the source of absolute truth, and a priori I admit the existence of other opinions, approaches and methods.
I will deliberately try to bypass the question of how good these or those methods are from the point of view of an ordinary netizen. I will deliberately try to leave aside the political underpinnings of the issue, which I also ask readers. I will try not to mention any specific countries of the individual and organization.
Impact vectors
Before discussing control and counteraction, it would be a good idea to define the object of control. Therefore, we will start with the methods of influence, or, in other words, the dissemination of (dis) information.
Official media
All self-respecting media now have their own news portals, pages in social networks and, often, messengers, and are actively involved in disseminating information on the network.
The term “official” does not necessarily mean “government”. Official - these are registered, actually existing for a long time, organizations that operate in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where they are registered. Their distinctive feature is the need to act in the legal field and be accountable for their actions before the law in their jurisdiction.
Examples:
Private and public news agencies in any country.
The need to be held accountable before the law limits the dissemination of outright disinformation through these channels. Spreading outright disinformation through such channels is akin to using nuclear weapons. It has a huge effect, but it leads to self-destruction of the instrument.
An example of direct misinformation:
"The president of" such and such a country "resigned as a result of a coup d'état, provided that this is actually not the case.
After such "news" in almost any jurisdiction, this media outlet will cease to exist.
However, indirect misinformation is possible. Examples:
"In the T ****** channel of the Deputy Prime Minister of <such and such country> there was information that the president resigned following a coup d'etat." In this message there will not be a single word of untruth, provided that the message to "canela" really was. How it appeared there, and whether it is a real "channel" - does not really matter. Under the laws of most jurisdictions, this media outlet will not be held liable for the dissemination of this message.
Options:
- According to messages in the channel of some messenger.
- According to posts on social media.
- From a video that has surfaced on the network.
- According to a report from another media outlet that is not, in fact, "official".
- According to the organization's report
- According to the "expert"
A direct indication of the source immediately before the information itself always means "we are not sure about the accuracy of the information and will leave the judgment on you." Under the laws of most jurisdictions, this means “we disclaim all responsibility” for the accuracy of the information.
The first three categories are the easiest to use, but have limited effect. most of the audience is skeptical about such communities.
The next two categories require the maintenance of a certain number of fly-by-night organizations in order to spread disinformation and take responsibility for themselves. “Convenient” jurisdictions are often chosen for such organizations.
With "experts" it is most convenient. They express only their personal opinion, and the media does not bear any direct responsibility for what they say, or this responsibility is limited. The requirements for the media do not apply directly to the "expert". Any self-respecting media has a quick recruitment of "experts" for all occasions.
I ask you not to conclude that all "experts" and "organizations" lie and spread disinformation, and all messages in messengers and social networks are fakes. This is far from the case. However, it should always be borne in mind that the indirect dissemination of disinformation using these tools through the official media is possible and used.
We've all probably heard about Fake News.
Aggregators
Long gone are the days when users mainly received information from a single source. The era of various aggregators has long come, starting with RSS, ending with services like Google / Yandex news.
Large aggregators have a wide audience and, at the same time, exclusively cite other people's messages, bearing limited liability before the law.
As a result, they are a tasty morsel for disseminators of (disin) information.
Because aggregators almost always cite official media reports, then, all methods applicable there are applicable here. However, there is an additional tool that is much more efficient and only applies to aggregators.
By analogy with "Fake News", the official media uses "Fake Agencies" here.
“Fake Agencies” are spontaneously created and, not necessarily, registered one-day media outlets that, during an attack, spontaneously or in advance register in aggregators and spread disinformation.
In their free time from the spread of disinformation, such "Fake Mass Media" are engaged in reprinting (almost always automated) news from official channels to create the appearance of vigorous activity, and, in principle, do not have their own staff.
Often, these "media" are made thematic to give more "weight" in the eyes of the reader.
An abstract housewife will trust the recipe for pancakes from the World of Culinary Magazine more than the analogous recipe from the Vladivostok Segodnya newspaper (the names of the publications are invented, but coincidences are random).
This tool is extremely effective because due to the audience's interest in the topic and the principles of aggregators' work, specially composed messages quickly gain popularity and receive large coverage, even if no one knows the media that published them.
Social networks
An extremely important and effective tool for disseminating information. All thanks to "groups", "likes", "comments", "moderation", "culture of reposting", "fake accounts" and "subscribers". In most jurisdictions, social networks allow the dissemination of almost any information while bearing only personal responsibility, which can be easily avoided using means of anonymization.
Groups - work directly. They perform a function similar to fake media. Unlike them, they can be "Live", that is, they can actively interact with subscribers. Groups can be created by cybercriminals either independently or stolen from their owners using technical means.
Likes - allow you to maintain the interest of the audience over time, and increase the reach of certain messages. In particular, thanks to the appearance of notifications like “your friend
liked this and that”.
Comments - allow you to maintain the interest of the audience in the topic, increase coverage on resources, create the appearance of "public resonance" and "public support / censure".
Moderation - allows you to correct and delete (dis) information and block users who distribute it in controlled social networks. It can be carried out at different levels, - controlled by user accounts, by the administration of the resource, or at the legislative / administrative level.
Reposting - popularization of the “like - share” culture further increases the reach of the audience, as well as likes, further enhancing the impact of the fact that the message is the result of the active action of the “friend”.
Fake accounts - no, these are not just single "bots". There are millions and millions of social media accounts that look completely alive. They lead an active "social" life. Thanks to the automated copying of data from real accounts in other / the same social networks with minor changes, biographical data. They have a lot of "friends" from the same fakes and real users.
Many have at least once come across unfamiliar “people” who “added” to your friends, with whom you talked only a few times in the beginning and forgot. Almost no one deletes such "friends", because the more “friends” you have, the “better”. However, the owner of such an account, having signed up to you as a "friend" in "Facebook", can use your slightly modified information to contain a fake account in "Contact" (the names are invented, and the coincidences are random).
Many of these accounts, under centralized, automated control, can “like”, “post”, “repost”, “comment” on time, increasing audience reach and attracting more attention to the desired messages in time. These same means can create the appearance of "public support / censure" and "public resonance" in social networks.
Subscribers - many are subscribed and follow the messages of famous people for some reason. All messages from these accounts have a large reach and are more often in the media.
With the exception of "official accounts" for these messages, the authors do not bear any responsibility, except for personal responsibility in most jurisdictions. Individuals with a large number of subscribers, from the point of view of disseminators of disinformation, perform the same function as “experts” in traditional media.
We all came across and saw that something like a “popular actor from Novonorilsk” suddenly starts spreading information that is not typical for him, for example, making political statements. The reasons can be different, from trivial money, to account hacking or blackmail, personal beliefs, both old and naturally or artificially formed on the wave of "hype". Often, due to personal convictions, people are ready to support the dissemination of this or that (dis) information in the reliability of which they are not sure.
Because most of the owners of popular accounts care about their reputation; direct disinformation is rarely disseminated through them. They are often used to draw attention to already existing topics or messages.
In no case should you think that all of this is "evil." These are just tools that can be used for both evil and good. Including, for the dissemination of disinformation, and therefore fall into the sphere of interests of states.
"Newfangled" applications
All sorts of "T *******" instant messengers and applications-analogues of social networks fall into this category. From the point of view of dissemination of (dis) information, they do not carry anything new in comparison with their “web” analogs, with the exception of the possibility of equipping them with technical means of counteracting the control over the dissemination of (dis) information.
Control and counteraction methods
Prevention
Preventive measures against the dissemination of (dis) information are possible and actively used in most countries.
First of all, it is direct work with the population and general explanation of possible mechanisms and purposes of disseminating (dis) information. He who is forewarned is armed. The trained and warned population is harder to deceive.
Another method of prevention is the direct dissemination of obvious misinformation that does not directly harm the state. Using the same channels that can be used to disseminate (dis) information by the adversary, it is possible to disseminate false information that does not harm the state with subsequent refutation through the official media.
Regular work with the population drastically reduces public confidence in such sources of information and increases trust in the official media in their own jurisdiction.
Those who do not want to learn from the mistakes of others will learn from their own.
Counter-impact
This category includes:
- Dissemination of direct refutation of (dis) information.
- Dissemination of information about the dubiousness of the source of the message- (dis) information.
- Dissemination of many messages that reduce (destroy) the reputation of the source.
- Shifting attention - creating a new topic / message flow in order to shift the attention of the audience to a "more pressing problem".
- Creation of information noise / fog - a multitude of (including false) messages on related topics and their dissemination through the channels used by the enemy, in such a way that the information created by the enemy (mis) is lost against this background, and trust in the channels is finally lost.
- Dissemination of a message similar to the original (mis) information (or a set of them) containing information distorted relative to the original, otherwise accented, parody, joke and / or bringing to the point of absurdity.
Measures are often used in combination.
You can find examples of such influences and counter-influences in this article and in the comments to it, if you carefully read both it itself and the comments and set yourself a similar goal.
Restrictive measures
This is the very category that I would like to discuss today. This includes all sorts of technical blockages, as well as legislative / injunctive relief and consequences.
Types of restrictive measures
I would like to divide restrictive measures into two categories:
- Active restrictive measures - censorship, moderation, blocking of distribution channels - sites, messengers, applications, compulsory licensing of the media.
- — , , , — , «». (honeypot), / ( . «»/«»/ .) .
Freedom, as you know, does not imply a lack of responsibility for one's actions, therefore, more liberal countries usually tend to passive measures, while less liberal ones tend to active countermeasures. To one degree or another, both types of measures are probably used by all countries.
However, I would like to note that it is subjectively easier to survive the blocking of a group in "Contact" than, instead, a subpoena, a bill for a round sum, or a visit from the competent authorities. Therefore, active countermeasures are much more easily perceived by society in the absence of "passive" legal consequences.
Passive restrictive measures are much more effective in the long term, and the existence of only technical means of active counteraction with no legal consequences at all is ineffective.
So how do you “correctly” block “T *******”?
The following suggestions are seen by the author as a good balance of active and passive measures.
An administrative article is introduced:
"Illegal use of technical means of counteracting control over the dissemination of (dis) information"
With a meager fine (let it be approximately the price of one ice cream in the nearest store, so that any "grandmother" can pay for it leaving her "grandson" for which she was fined) with the imposition of a restrictive measure - deprivation of the right to provide access to the Internet until the fine is paid. The restrictive measure should be implemented by the provider and applied only to the terminal from which the access was made.
An additional limitation is no more than 2 fines per month from one terminal. After the second fine, access should be blocked until the purchase of the corresponding "license" (see below) for a period of at least a month, which should not cost more than the amount of one fine. You cannot write out more than one fine at the same time per terminal. You cannot issue penalties for the periods before the terminal is unlocked after the last penalty has been paid (chronologically). Principle - "paid - received" amnesty "".
In total, the maximum amount of fines / fees is two or three “ice creams” per month from the terminal.
It is necessary to fine the one for whom the contract for Internet access is drawn up. The fine must be accompanied by time, place, and logs, which clearly show when and what was used from his access terminal. It is necessary to introduce technical means to prevent the automation of payment of this fine by users, prohibit providers from paying fines for users, and accept payments on state portals like Russian "Gosuslugs" with mandatory verification and entering the passport data of the terminal owner and CAPCHI. In this case, the data must match the data provided by the provider. It doesn't have to be expensive. This should be inconvenient, and especially inconvenient for those who use someone else's Internet access.
The technical means falling into the above category must include allmessengers / applications equipped with protection against monitoring , all VPN services / protocols and all "anonymizers".
What about public hotspots and corporate VPNs?
For public access points, cafes, airports, private organizations and, including individuals, create "Licenses for the use of means to counter the control of the dissemination of (dis) information." With a declared maximum number of terminals.
Licenses are issued upon request, of course, to the official authorities, indicating the maximum number of users / access terminals, but, without restrictions , to everyone who wants. The cost of a license should not exceed the amount of one fine for each terminal, and its renewal and payment should be automated.
This means that any person or organization should be able to afford such a license to buy / issue, and use instant messengers and VPN freely, without restrictions. However, you need to do this in person and not through the provider.
If the payment of the fine is akin to an "amnesty", then the purchase of a license works as an "indulgence".
Emergency countermeasures
If it is necessary to introduce emergency measures to counter the dissemination of (dis) information, the state should have the right and the ability to temporarily block all subscriber terminals belonging to a person or organization from whose terminal a similar action is / or is recorded. Even if you have a license. Before the trial, but for no more than a certain, short period - hours / day. The state should be financially responsible for unlawful (false) restrictions, as well as responsibility for finding and identifying the perpetrators. For example, in the case of an open hotspot, it is necessary to identify the person who used the terminal. Appropriate hardware should be provided by the owners of the access points. For example, by requesting a phone number with SMS confirmation.
The owner of the hotspot should be administratively responsible for providing false information or not providing it.
As a territorial emergency measure, it should be possible to block all terminals with a similar license, operating through any Internet providers, and located in a certain territory, taking into account the type of terminal and the stated purpose of its use (individual / organization, open / closed). This is seen as a softer measure than the current full blocking of network access for everyone.
Where will the money go?
The money from the fines should be divided between the agency organizing the anti-dissemination of (dis) information and the providers, at a flat rate for each subscriber access terminal.
How will it work?
Most people will use the internet and will not use VPNs or prohibited applications / protocols. At the same time, people will be extremely cautious about distributing free internet to neighbors / friends and using unsecured networks at home. You can get a fine, and, what is more unpleasant, blocking access until it is paid.
The rest will buy licenses and live in peace, exactly until they begin to actively disseminate (dis) information, or physically stay in places that are subject to emergency restrictive measures.
The state will know all users of "countermeasures" in person, and pay special attention, for example, to the terminals of citizens of foreign states and members of foreign organizations, which often appear in the zones of introduction of emergency measures or zones of "high attention".
Until you start using “means of countering the control over the dissemination of (dis) information”, the state should not be at all interested in who you are, where you are from, and how you use the network access terminal. The request for user data from the provider (s) should occur only after the use of "funds" or the purchase of a license.
The problems of financing the department and the equipment of providers with the appropriate technical means will be partially solved.
PS
I think this is a good balance between a complete active blocking of everything, which causes a sharp negative reaction and, at the same time, is technically impossible, and passive restrictions with draconian accounts and lawsuits.
All this is purely my subjective opinion.
PPS
The quote at the beginning of the article is often found on the network together with an indication of the source, however, the source is not confirmed. Please take it only as an example of the impact on the audience.
PPPS
Unfortunately, due to the sharp negative reaction from the audience, I lost the ability to respond to your comments, however, thanks to users like Wyrdfor the fact that at least someone has a sense of humor :-).
On the advice of the userAngelNetmoved the article from the IT Legislation Hub to the Reading Room Hub, since the audience from the first clearly takes it too seriously :-). I would like to note that later the article was moved, apparently, by the moderators to the “Chulan” hub.
I will answer the userJustDontto the fact that I "allegedly did not lose the opportunity to leave comments": The
ability to leave comments on Habré disappeared almost immediately after publication. At the same time, at this moment, and for a long time after, I still had positive karma. This indicates the presence of alternative mechanisms of restrictions on Habré that are not directly related to karma. I will also add that this very possibility "magically" returned five minutes after adding this paragraph to the article. And, then, it disappeared again, after adding the previous sentence ... a day has passed since the publication and it seems now my ability to leave comments began to obey the “laws of karma”.
I also ask the Khabrovites to note that I intentionally did not use the word "propaganda" until this moment. Disinformation is deliberately false information by definition, and the establishment of the "non-truth" of a message / source is possible in an investigative manner. This is just one type of "propaganda". Please do not generalize everything written about "propaganda" in general.
PPPPS
I would like to hear from readers something about the ways of manipulating public opinion on the network, which I missed. Constructive comments on the proposed set of measures are also welcome.